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SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
The court's decision is not inconsistent with § 16(b)'s policy. The
lowest price in, highest price out rule is a method of profit computa-
tion, not of property valuation. Property valuation is distinct from
profit computation; its purchase is to reach a realistic and fair deter-
mination of value so that profits can be computed. If property valua-
tion is affected by a policy of squeezing out all possible profits,
§ 16(b)'s supposed remedial purpose would assume a punitive charac-
ter.
RUSSELL L. HWIT
IV. SECURITIES EXCHANGES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
In enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' Congress cre-
ated a scheme of self-regulation and agency supervision for the na-
tional securities exchanges. 2 By its nature, this regulatory scheme at
57. In another recent case, Kramer v. Ayer, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 95,483 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), it was held that in determining the cost of stock acquired in a merger, the value
of the stock given up should include the increase in value attributable to the merger.
Id. at 99,440-41. In Kramer, defendant sold shares of stock he had acquired in a merger
less than six months subsequent to the merger. Defendant was liable under § 16(b)
because at the time of the merger he became a director of the acquiring corporation.
In calculating the amount of profits for which defendant was liable, the court had to
determine the value of shares exchanged in the merger for the new shares. Plaintiff
argued that any increase in the value of the stock attributable to the merger (merger
announced weeks in advance) should not be included in the valuation but should be
included in the profits owing the corporation. The court rejected this argument, stating
that defendant could not "be held liable for accretion in value of the consideration
given that it accrued prior to his becoming an insider." Id. at 99,441.
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (Supp. Aug.
1975).
2 Section 6 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78f (1970), provides for registration proce-
dures with the Securities Exchange Commission but grants the exchanges substantial
freedom in adopting their own rules as long as the rules are consistent with the securi-
ties laws. Id. § 78f(c). However, section 19, id. § 78s, grants the Commission supervi-
sory authority to review and, if necessary to protect investors or to insure fair dealing
in securities, to alter or supplement exchange rules in twelve specific areas of exchange
regulation. Id. § 78s(b). The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-
78kk (Supp. Aug. 1975), significantly increased the supervisory authority of the Com-
mission and restricted the amount of freedom previously given to the exchanges in
adopting rules. Amended section 6 precludes an exchange from adopting any rules that
impose an unnecessary burden on competition. Id. § 78f(b)(8). Amended Section 19
no longer limits SEC supervision to specific areas, but provides that all exchange rules
be reviewed and approved by the Commission. Id. § 78s(b).
1976]
1000 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
times conflicts with the policy of the antitrust laws. 3 When such a
conflict exists, the courts must determine whether Congress intended
the regulatory scheme to be paramount to, and thus impliedly repeal,
the antitrust laws.' Because Congress did not grant the exchanges an
express exemption from the antitrust laws, the courts utilize the doc-
trine of implied repeal in deciding whether an exchange activity is
immune from antitrust challenge. 5
The courts impliedly repeal the antitrust laws in two situations.
First, if the courts find that Congress has created a pervasive regula-
tory scheme over an industry, the presumption is that Congress in-
tended the regulatory scheme to displace the antitrust laws with
respect to all regulated activity.' Second, even if the courts conclude
that a regulatory scheme is not so pervasive as to exempt all industry
activity from antitrust scrutiny, a specific statutory provision may
repeal the antitrust laws with respect to the particular activity which
the statutory provision governs.
7
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
held that the Exchange Act did not create a pervasive regulatory
scheme over the securities exchanges.' Thus, for a particular ex-
See Johnson, Application of the Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry 20 Sw.
L. J. 536, 554-55 (1966); Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the Securi-
ties Field, 16 WEST. REs. L. REV. 131, 131-32 (1964).
1 The issue is whether maintenance of an antitrust suit would be incompatible
with the intended operation of the regulatory scheme. Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341,
358 (1963). Congressional intent is the determining factor. See Federal Maritime
Comm'n. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 729 (1973); Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973).
1 There being no express exemption from the antitrust laws, the courts must infer
from the regulatory scheme congressional intent to repeal impliedly the antitrust laws
with respect to the regulated activity. The courts have developed a number of princi-
ples to follow in applying this doctrine. Repeal of the antitrust laws by implication is
not favored. Antitrust immunity will be implied only when there exists a "plain repug-
nancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions," United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963), and even then, only "to the minimum extent
necessary [to make the regulatory act work]." Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963). See also Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 682-83 (1975); United States v. NASD,
422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975). For an example of an express congressional exemption,
see McLean Trucking Co. v. United States 321 U.S. 67 (1944), holding that § 5(11) of
the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1970), exempted a merger approved
by the ICC from the antitrust laws. 321 U.S. at 73-76.
, See United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 733 (1975); Cf. Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973).
1 See Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 683 (1975); Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341,
360-361 (1963).
373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Id. at 360-61.
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change practice to be immune from antitrust challenge, there must
be a specific statutory provision giving the SEC sufficient regulatory
authority over the particular challenged conduct to indicate a con-
gressional intent that the regulatory scheme be paramount to the
antitrust laws with respect to this particular activity."0 When Silver
was decided, the SEC's authority over securities exchanges was re-
stricted to twelve specific areas of exchange activity," and thus anti-
trust immunity was dependent on one of these provisions. The Secur-
ities Acts Amendments of 1975,11 however, signficantly increased the
SEC's supervisory authority over the exchanges. The amendments'
purpose is to create a more competitive securities market by "vesting
in the SEC power to eliminate all unnecessary and inappropriate
burdens on competition . . ."3 Two recent Supreme Court deci-
sions indicate that in expanding the SEC's authority over securities
exchanges, the amendments have also expanded the scope of ex-
change activity which will be immune from the antitrust laws."
In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ,' 5 plaintiff brought
a class action against the New York and American Stock Exchanges
alleging that the defendants' practices of fixing minimum commis-
sion rates violated the antitrust laws.'" The Supreme Court dismissed
the action, holding that § 19(b)(9) of the 1934 Act, 7 which authorized
the SEC to supervise exchange fixing of commission rates, repealed
the antitrust laws with respect to this particular exchange practice.'"
to Id.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
12 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (Supp. Aug. 1975).
'3 S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 13 (1975).
" See Baker, Antitrust Law and Policy in the Securities Industry: A Tale of Two
Days in June, 31 Bus. LAW. 743 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Baker]; Note, SEC
Regulation as a Pervasive Regulatory Scheme - Implied Repeal of the Antitrust Law
with Respect to National Securities Exchanges, 44 FoRD. L. REV. 355 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Note, 44 FORD. L. Rlv. 355]; Note, Securities Regulations and
Antitrust Laws - Implied Repeal of the Antitrust Laws with Respect to Practices of
the Securities Industry - Active SEC Review or Pervasive Regulatory Scheme Suffi-
cient to Imply Immunity, 9 LoyoLA U. L. Rv. 226 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note,
9 LooLA U. L. REv. 226].
' 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
,6 Id. at 660-61.
,7 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b) (Supp. Aug.,
1975), authorizes the SEC to supervise and, if necessary to protect investors or insure
fair dealings in securities, to order changes in exchange rules with respect to "the fixing
of reasonable rates of commission. .. "
"1 422 U.S. at 691. One commentator, however, has argued that § 19(b) does not
authorize the securities exchange to fix commission rates and, therefore, does not
repeal the antitrust laws. Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel
Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. REv. 675 (1970).
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In dismissing, the Court relied on the legislative history of the
Exchange Act, which indicated a congressional intent "to leave the
supervision of the fixing of reasonable [commission] rates. . . to the
SEC."' 9 Furthermore, it was noted that the SEC had actively re-
viewed exchange commission rate practices, 20 and in 1975 abolished
fixed rates.2' Since the SEC had exercised its jurisdiction under §
19(b)(9), application of the antitrust laws to the exchanges would
subject them to conflicting standards of conduct.2 Thus, repeal of the
antitrust laws was necessary to reconcile this conflict. The Court also
noted that the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act had continued
the SEC's supervisory authority over the area of commission rates,
thus indicating that Congress approved of the regulatory scheme
which provided for SEC review of rate practices.?
In stressing the necessity of impliedly repealing the antitrust laws
to make the Exchange Act work, the Court rejected2' the interpreta-
tion of "necessity" made in Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. 25 There the Seventh Circuit held that in determining
if repeal was necessary a court should make a factual determination
whether permitting antitrust challenge of the exchange practice
would actually "frustrate the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act
or make it substantially ineffective."" In Gordon, the Supreme Court
'1 422 U.S. at 691. The Court noted that Congress was aware that prior to the 1934
Act there was an established practice of the securities exchanges fixing commission
rates and that Congress, by not prohibiting such practice in the 1934 Act, decided to
permit the exchanges, subject to SEC supervision, to continue this practice. Id. at 663-
68.
20 Id. at 668-82. Since 1958 the SEC had been engaged in a continuous review of
the effect of fixed commission rates. Id. at 668. But see, Werner, Adventure in Social
Control of Finance: The National Market System for Securities, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
1233, 1290-92 (1975).
11 As of May 1, 1975, fixed commission rates have been prohibited. SEC Reg. 19b-
3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3(a) (1975).
2 422 U.S. at 689. The Court stated different standards would be applied "be-
cause the sole aim of antitrust legislation is to protect competition, whereas the SEC
must consider, in addition, the economic health of investors, the exchanges, and the
securities industry." Id. See also 15 U.S.C. 78s(b) (1970).
22 See § 6(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(e)(1) (Supp. Aug. 1975). Although § 6(e)
generally prohibits fixed rates, it authorizes the SEC to allow fixed rates if reasonable
in relation to cost and if they do not unnecessarily burden competition.
20 422 U.S. at 686-87.
25 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). In Thill, the court
held that the exchange's antirebate rule, which prohibited a member of the exchange
from sharing a commission with a non-member, was not necessary to make the Ex-
change Act work.
25 Id. at 270.
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ruled that a factual determination whether repeal was necessary was
improper. The issue was "a legal question as to whether allowance of
an antitrust suit would conflict with the operation of the regulatory
scheme which specifically authorizes the SEC to oversee the fixing of
commission rates."" To insure that the regulatory scheme function
as envisioned by Congress, the Court ruled that if subjecting an ex-
change practice to antitrust suit would conflict with the operation of
the regulatory scheme, antitrust immunity must be implied as a
matter of law.?
" 422 U.S. at 688. This ruling also affects the holding of Ricci v. Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973), which dealt with the question whether a court,
presented with an issue of antitrust immunity based on the doctrine of implied repeal,
should apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and permit an administrative agency
to hear the case before the court proceeds. See 3 K. DAvis, ADMISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 19.01 (1958). In Ricci, the Supreme Court held that a district court in which
an antitrust suit has been brought should stay its proceeding until completion of
administrative review if such a review would aid the court in determining if repeal is
necessary to make a regulatory scheme work. 409 U.S. at 302. Administrative review
would aid a court in deciding such an antitrust issue because the administrative agency
reviewing the case could decide issues of fact concerning the incompatibility between
the regulatory scheme and the antitrust laws. Id. However, the issue is no longer a
factual question, but a legal question. Thus, an initial review of the case by an agency
will be of material aid to a court only if the agency's determinations will aid the court
in deciding how Congress envisioned the regulatory scheme to work. If the 1975 amend-
ments have created a pervasive regulatory scheme over exchanges, see text accompa-
nying notes 49-61, infra, there will be no antitrust issue to decide on a case by case
approach, and thus an agency will be the only forum, subject to judicial review, in
which to hear the case.
,1 Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas noted that active review by the SEC
pursuant to the Exchange Act was the determining factor in concluding that repeal
was necessary. He stated:
Only if the SEC is actively and aggressively exercising its powers of
review and approval can we be sure that fixed commission rates are
being monitored in the manner which Congress intended.
422 U.S. 659, 692 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Under the Court's holding, it would seem that the antitrust laws can not be
permitted to support the regulatory scheme when challenged conduct violates both the
Exchange Act and the antitrust laws. Although in such a situation no actual conflict
exists between the regulatory scheme and the antitrust laws, application of the anti-
trust laws would interfere with the intended operation of the Exchange Act. But see
Baker, supra note 14, at 747-48.
For example, in Schaefer v. First Nat'l. Bank, 509 F.2d 1207, 1299-1300 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1682 (1976), the Seventh Circuit held that the antitrust
laws were not applicable to a stock manipulation scheme regulated by § 10(b) and §
17 of the Exchange Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 77q (1970). Even though the manipula-
tion scheme violated both the antitrust laws and § 10(b) and § 17, the court reasoned
that § 10(b) and § 17 evidenced congressional intent to deal with stock manipulation
under the Exchange Act only. Application of the antitrust laws in Schaefer would have
1976] 1003
1004 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
The facts in Gordon required repeal of the antitrust laws because
of a clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and a specific statu-
tory provision of the Exchange Act. 9 The Court's grant of antitrust
immunity was restricted to the particular activity, fixing commission
rates, regulated by a specific statutory provision, § 19(b)(9). Such a
holding was necessary under the Exchange Act, which limited SEC
supervisory authority over exchanges to twelve delineated areas."
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, however, significantly in-
creased the SEC's authority over securities exchanges. Section 19 no
longer limits SEC authority over exchanges to specific areas, but
grants the SEC authority to review all proposed rules3 and order
adoption of new rules or changes in existing ones32 in all areas of
exchange practices. Thus, the amendments have expanded the scope
of the specific statutory provision which the Gordon Court concluded
mandated repeal of the antitrust laws. 3
interfered with the operation of the Exchange Act because the antitrust laws provide
different enforcement sanctions to punish persons for and deter others from engaging
in the proscribed conduct than § 10(b) and § 17. Compare sanctions provided by the
antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. Mar. 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)
(Wrongdoer is deemed guilty of felony and subject to fine of one million dollars if a
corporation, or if an individual, one hundred thousand dollars, or three years imprison-
ment, or both.); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (Wrongdoer is liable civilly to an injured party
for three times actual damages.) with sanctions available under § 10(b) and § 17, where
a private right of action is implied for recovery of actual damages by the injured person
caused by the fraud. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154-
55 (1972); Superintendent v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971); 6 L. Loss,
SECURITIEs REGULATION 3869-73 (Supp. 1969) (§ 10(b)); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die,
Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969) (§ 17). Thus, a "legal" conflict justifying repeal of
the antitrust laws would seem to exist whenever the antitrust laws provide for different
standards to judge the propriety of challenged conduct, Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659,
689 (1975), or different enforcement sanctions to regulate conduct than provisions of
the Exchange Act dealing with the same conduct. Cf. Schaefer v. First Nat'l. Bank,
509 F.2d 1287, 1299-1300 (1975).
" See 422 U.S. at 692 (Stewart, J., concurring).
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
31 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b) (Supp. Aug. 1975).
32 Id. § 78s(c).
33 See also Harding v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,461 (5th Cir. Mar. 8, 1976), where the Fifth Circuit held that an exchange's de-
listing of a stock pursuant to § 19(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3) (1970), was immune from
antitrust challenges. The court cited Gordon for support, stating:
This is the same section which authorized the SEC to review the fixing
of commission rates. Section 19(b) thus gives the SEC direct review
over delisting activity.
Id. at 99,334. Although the court's ruling was restricted to an exchange's delisting
activity, the decision indicates that any activity regulated by § 19 will be immune from
the antitrust laws.
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Application of the Gordon rationale to the amendments indicates
that since the SEC has supervisory authority over all areas of ex-
change activity pursuant to a specific statutory provision, all ex-
change practices may enjoy antitrust immunity. The legislative his-
tory of the amendments evidences a congressional intent to vest in
the SEC complete authority to supervise all exchange activity.
4
Moreover, the SEC must take an active part in reviewing and approv-
ing all exchange rules" and may order changes in exchange rules to
insure that exchange activity is not harmful to the investing public. 6
Finally, the basis of any SEC decision includes consideration of anti-
trust factors.37 Thus, under Gordon, repeal of the antitrust laws as to
all exchange practices would seem necessary if the 1975 amendments
are to operate as envisioned by Congress. However, analysis of the
amendments in terms of Gordon-basing repeal on a plain repug-
nancy created by a specific statutory provision-may not be neces-
sary. Gordon's companion case indicates that the 1975 amendments
may have created a pervasive regulatory scheme over exchanges
thereby indicating a congressional intent to repeal the antitrust laws'
application to securities exchanges generally.
The 1975 decision United States v. National Association of Secur-
ities Dealers, Inc.3" dealt with a conflict between the regulatory
scheme over securities associations created by the Maloney Act39 and
the antitrust laws. In NASD, the government charged that NASD
and its members had conspired to restrict the secondary dealer mar-
ket and the brokerage market in the purchase and sale of mutual fund
shares by adopting rules which had anti-competitive effects. After
See S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 13 (1975).
Whereas prior to the 1975 amendments an exchange rule did not require pre-
vious SEC approval, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1970), under the amendments, the SEC must
actually review and approve all rules before they become effective. 15 U.S.C.A. §
78s(b) (Supp. Aug. 1975).
15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(c) (Supp. Aug. 1975).
3' The Commission may not register any exchange if its rules unnecessarily burden
competition. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(b)(8) (Supp. Aug. 1975). Additionally, the Commis-
sion may not order an exchange to adopt or amend a rule unless it is satisfied the rule
will not burden competition. Id. § 78w(a)(2).
422 U.S. 694 (1975).
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3 (Supp. Aug. 1975).
The case also involved conflicts between the regulatory scheme over investment com-
panies created by the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et. seq. (1970), as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (Supp. Aug. 1975), and the antitrust laws. See
note 40 infra.
,0 422 U.S. at 730-32. The government also charged that certain mutual funds,
mutual fund underwriters, and broker-dealers had contracted to maintain the public
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reviewing the extent of the SEC's supervisory authority over NASD,
the Court concluded that NASD's rules and its enforcement of them
were exempt from antitrust scrutiny.'
The Court noted that the SEC had extensive authority over
NASD . The Commission controlled the registration of securities as-
sociations," reviewed all proposed rules and rule changes," and could
offering price of a mutual fund share in brokerage transactions and to prohibit inter-
dealer transactions in certain mutual fund shares. Id. at 702. After reviewing the
legislative history of the Investment Company Act, the Court concluded that § 22(f)
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1970), immunized these agreements from antitrust
attack. 422 U.S. at 706-30.
The Court noted that prior to the enactment of the 1940 Act, a principle feature
of the mutual fund distribution system was the two-price system. Id. at 720-30. Inher-
ent in this system were many abuses. Because the price of a mutual fund share was
based on the net asset value of the share determined at the end of the previous trading
day, an informed individual could calculate the present day's price and the following
day's price. This individual could thus engage in riskless trading in a secondary market
during the interim between the two trading days at the expense of the other sharehold-
ers. Id. at 706-09. Restrictions on the transferability of mutual fund shares were needed
to eliminate the two-price distribution system. The Court concluded that Congress
enacted § 22(f) to permit such restrictions, which were to be approved by the SEC.
The Court held, therefore, that the section displaced the antitrust laws. Id. at 721-30.
The Court also noted that because the section authorized the restrictions unless disap-
proved by the SEC, antitrust immunity was not dependent on exercise of the Commis-
sion's regulatory authority. Id. at 726. This aspect of the case is more fully discussed
in Note, 44 FORD. L. REv. 355, supra note 14 at 359-63; Note, 9 Loyola U. L. Rev. 226,
supra note 14 at 240-46.
11 The Court stated that it saw "no meaningful distinction between the associa-
tion's rules and the manner in which it construes and implements them." Id. at 733.
The Court's rationale for this statement was that "[e]ach is equally a subject of SEC
oversight." Id. However, though the SEC has authority to review, and disapprove,
association rules, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(j) (1970), as amended 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b) (Supp.
Aug. 1975), it does not have authority to review an association's proceedings under
its rules except with respect to disciplinary proceedings. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g) (1970),
as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(d) (Supp. Aug. 1975). But, an association may not
adopt rules unless they meet strict requirements, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1970), as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b) (Supp. Aug. 1975), including a requirement that they
"remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market." 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b) (Supp. Aug. 1975).
To the extent that the manner in which an association enforces its rules determines
whether the rules satisfy these requirements, the SEC does review association interpre-
tations and enforcements of its rules. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1970), as amended, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78s(h) (Supp. Aug. 1975), which states that the "Commission may ...
suspend the registration of any association if it finds that the rules thereof do not
conform to the requirements of this subsection .
,2 422 U.S. at 730.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b) (Supp. Aug.
1975). In particular, the SEC must be satisfied that the rules of an association are
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order an association to adopt a new rule or amend an existing rule. 5
In addition, any SEC decision in these areas was based on the protec-
tion of the public interest which the Commission indicated included
a consideration of the effects its decision would have on competition."
The Court concluded that this authority was sufficient to create a
pervasive regulatory scheme over securities associations and evi-
denced a congressional intent "to lift the ban of the Sherman Act
from association activities approved by the SEC."47
The NASD decision, unlike the Gordon decision, did not restrict
its holding to a particular activity regulated by a specific statutory
provision. Rather, based on a determination that the Maloney Act
created a pervasive regulatory scheme, it implied antitrust immunity
to all NASD activities." By indicating what amount of authority
designed "to protect investors and the public interest, and to remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8)
(1970).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(j) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b) (Supp. Aug.
1975).
45 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(c) (Supp. Aug.
1975).
11 See National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 486-87 (1945). Many
agencies and courts now consider antitrust factors as part of the public interest stan-
dard. See Baker, Competition and Regulation: Charles River Bridge Recrossed, 60
CORN. L. REv. 159, 162-63 (1975). But see United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 736-
38 (1975) (White, J., dissenting).
11 United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 733 (1975). The Court stated that to
subject "activities so directly related to the SEC's responsibility" to an antitrust suit
would impose two different standards for conduct on the NASD and repeal was thus
necessary to reconcile the conflicting standards. Id. at 735.
The Court did not cite subsection (n), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(n) (1970), which states
that "[i]f any provision of this section is in conflict with any provision of any law of
the United States in force on June 25, 1938, the provision of this section shall prevail."
One commentator has suggested that this section of the Maloney Act repeals the
antitrust laws with respect to securities associations. Mazo, Antitrust Courts Versus
the SEC: A Functional Allocation of Decision Making Roles, 12 HARv. J. LEGMS. 63, 80
(1974).
'A A comparison of the two regulatory schemes involved in Gordon and NASD
reveals that the Maloney Act authorized more extensive SEC regulation over securities
associations than the unamended Exchange Act authorized over exchanges. Under the
Maloney Act, the SEC could not register an association unless its rules removed impe-
diments to and perfected "the mechanism of a free and open market." 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
3(b) (8) (1970). The SEC, therefore, considered the effects on competition of an associa-
tion's rules before registering it. The Exchange Act, on the other hand, did not require
the SEC to consider antitrust factors before registering an exchange. Id. § 78f (1970).
Additionally, the Maloney Act required an association to file with the SEC all pro-
posed rules for Commission approval, id. § 78o-3(j), while under the Exchange Act an
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constitutes a pervasive regulatory scheme, the Court constructed a
standard which can be used in determining whether other regulatory
schemes are pervasive. The elements of that standard are: (1) control
of registration of the regulated organization, (2) authority to review
and disapprove all proposed rules or rule changes, (3) power to order
the adoption of any rule concerning any area of organization activity,
or the amendment or deletion of any existing rule, and (4) considera-
tion of antitrust factors as part of the basis for the regulatory agency's
decision with respect to the above three elemdnts.0 Analysis of the
1975 Securities Acts Amendments under this standard indicates that
the amendments have also created a pervasive regulatory scheme
over exchanges. 0
The 1975 Amendments include both securities exchanges and as-
sociations in one regulatory scheme," which was modeled on the 1938
Maloney Act.2 Under the amendments, the SEC controls the regis-
tration of exchanges, 53 reviews, and approves or disapproves all pro-
exchange could adopt any rule as long as it was consistent with the rules and regula-
tions of the Act and an exchange was not required to file proposed rules with the SEC.
Id. § 78f(c). Finally, the Maloney Act authorized the SEC to review and change
association rules concerning any area of association activity, id. § 78o-3(k), while the
Exchange Act only authorized SEC review power to amend exchange rules in specifi-
cally defined areas. Id. § 78s(b).
" United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 730-33 (1975).
Dissenting, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall,
criticized the majority holding on the ground "that, without more, agency power to
approve, and [even] agency approval itself, do not confer antitrust immunity [upon
regulated activity]." Id. at 741, (White, J., dissenting). He thought that repeal should
only be implied when the agency is directed to consider effects on competition. Id. at
742-43. He stated:
[Sluch an immunity can be implied only if Congress has clearly
supplanted the antitrust laws and their model of competition with a
differing competitive regime, defined by particularized competitive
standards and enforced by an administrative agency ....
Id. at 743.
5° The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 direct the SEC to consider the effects
on competition any association or exchange rule will have. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§
78f(b)(8), 78o-3(b)(9) (Supp. Aug. 1975), which state that the SEC may not register
any exchange or association whose rules unnecessarily burden competition, and id. §
78w(a)(2), which states that the SEC cannot order an exchange or association to adopt
or amend a rule if it unnecessarily burdens competition. Therefore, it would seem that
the amendments satisfy the criticisms of the NASD dissenters. See note 49 supra.
11 Compare registration requirements, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(f) (Supp. Aug. 1975) (ex-
changes) with id. § 78o-3(a)(b) (associations). Both registered exchanges and asso-
ciations are regulated pursuant to § 19, id. § 78(s). See also, S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th
Cong. 1st Sess. 127 (1975).
52 S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1975).
53 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f (Supp. Aug. 1975).
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posed exchange rules,54 orders the exchange to adopt new rules or
amend existing rules,5 5 and considers anti-competitive factors when
making decisions." Thus, under NASD, the authority over exchanges
vested in the SEC is sufficient to create a pervasive regulatory
scheme. More important, however, is the indication in the legislative
history of the amendments that Congress intended to repeal the anti-
trust laws' application to securities exchanges by creating a pervasive
regulatory scheme.
The Senate Report on the amendments noted that a major pur-
pose of the 1975 amendments was to increase competition in the
securities markets.57 Congress provided for this increased competition
by "vesting in the SEC power to eliminate all unnecessary and inap-
51 Id. § 78s(b). No proposed rule or rule change may take effect unless approved
by the SEC, id. § 78s(b)(1), subject to certain exceptions, id. § 78s(b)(3). Under the
prior Maloney Act, an association's proposed rule or rule change would become effec-
tive in 13 days unless disapproved by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(j) (1970). Thus, a
rule might have become effective without the SEC ever affirmatively having approved
the rule or exercised its jurisdiction. This was a major criticism of the NASD holding
by the dissent. See 422 U.S. at 745 (White, J., dissenting). The amendments, by
requiring the SEC to exercise its jurisdiction, would seem to satisfy this complaint,
since the amendments have provided for the increased regulatory authority the dissen-
ters thought was lacking to create a pervasive regulatory scheme. See also S. REP. No.
94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975), stating it was Congress' intent to obligate the
SEC to exercise its power of approval.
Id. § 78s(c).
Id. §§ 78f(b)(8) (registering and approving exchange rules); § 78w(a)(2) (order-
ing exchange to adopt, amend, or delete rules). See also S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14 (1975), which states that the amendments are "designed to force the
Commission to focus with particularity on the competitive implications of each regula-
tory requirement."
" The goal of the 1975 amendments is to create a national market system, utiliz-
ing the latest communications and data processing facilities, that would
provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securities, .
assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences
or advantages among investors, . . . ensure that securities can be
purchased and sold at economically efficient transaction costs, and
• . .provide, to the maximum degree practicable, markets that are
open and orderly.
S. REP. No. 94-975, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 7-12 (1975). See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78k-1 (Supp.
Aug. 1975); Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance: The National Market
System for Securities, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1233 (1975). Increased competition was
viewed as a necessity to achieve these goals, and thus became a goal in itself. S. REP.
No. 94-75, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 12-14 (1975). Although competition was not the para-
mount purpose of the amendments, the Commission must balance the anticompetitive
effects of any decision against the purposes of the amendments that would be furthered
and the cost of doing so. Id. at 13-14.
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propriate burdens on competition . *. . .'" Additionally, the report
states that SEC approval of an exchange rule "would constitute a
determination ... that the rule was within the permitted purposes
. ..of the Exchange Act."59 Finally, the Conference Report is further
evidence that Congress intended securities exchange activity to be
subject only to review within the regulatory scheme created by the
amendments and not the antitrust courts. The conferees recognized
that this new regulatory scheme would conflict with the antitrust
laws. However, they were confident the courts would avoid actual
conflicts. If the courts failed to reconcile the regulatory and competi-
tive needs of the securities industry, the conferees noted that Con-
gress would consider further legislation."
Under either NASD's pervasive regulatory scheme analysis or
Gordon's specific statutory provision analysis, the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975 have granted to the securities exchanges broad
antitrust immunity. Because it only becomes necessary to consider
whether particular exchange activity is exempted from the antitrust
laws by a specific provision of the Exchange Act when it is deter-
mined that the Act has not created a pervasive regulatory scheme,'
the courts should first analyze the amendments in light of NASD.
Application of the NASD standard to the amendments indicates that
securities exchanges are now subject to a pervasive regulatory scheme
and thus exempt from the antitrust laws. Whether this regulatory
scheme and the resulting antitrust immunity will frustrate the policy
of the antitrust laws is not known. 2 However, the amendments and
S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 13 (1975).
Id. at 28.
'o CONF. REP. No. 94-229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1975). Further evidence
that Congress intends to grant the securities exchanges total antitrust immunity is that
the amendments increased the scope of judicial review of SEC actions. Previously, an
aggrieved party could appeal only an SEC order, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1970), see PBW
Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 723 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
969 (1974), but under the amendments, an aggrieved party may appeal both an order,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78y(a) (Supp. Aug. 1975), and a rule, id. § 78y(b), to the Federal Court
of Appeals. Because the SEC is directed to consider antitrust factors in reaching any
decision as to the propriety of exchange activity, the reviewing circuit court will also
review the anti-competitive effects which the exchange's action will have. Thus, in-
cluded with this new regulatory scheme is a judicial determination whether any ex-
change activity unnecessarily or inappropriately burdens competition. This provision
for judicial review provides an alternative remedy to the antitrust courts and thus
renders a separate antitrust suit superfluous. See Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 309 (1963); Gordon v. NYSE, 498 F.2d 1303, 1311 (2d
Cir. 1974), af'd. 422 U.S. 659 (1975); cf. Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 358 n.12 (1963).
"' See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1963).
,2 Under the prior regulatory scheme, the SEC did not always act affirmatively
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their legislative history demonstrate that Congress chose the SEC
and not the antitrust courts as the vehicle through which to regulate
competition in the securities industry.
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to insure competition. One commentator termed the SEC a "tame watchdog" and
noted that the SEC had taken a passive, rather than an active, role in regulating
securities exchanges. See Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The
Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 663,
664-65 (1964). However, hopefully this will no longer be a problem. Under the amend-
ments, the SEC must take an active role in regulating exchanges. See 15 U.S.C.A. §
78s(b) (Supp. Aug. 1975) (requiring SEC approval of exchange rules before it becomes
effective); S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975) (noting that amendments
were to force SEC to exercise its authority).

